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Palestine Through the Central Asian Lens: Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan's Independent Media Narratives of the Gaza War (2023-2026)

Bekzhan Turdybek
KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan
email: bekzhan.turdybek@kimep.kz

Abstract

The October 2023 escalation of the war between Israel and Palestine led to a long-term controversy at the humanitarian and strategic level in the regions, such as Central Asia. This article focuses on the coverage and assessment of the stance of independent media outlets in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding their position on the Gaza war from October 2023 to February 2026. The government's position is being dealt with as a mediated object through framing instead of being a fixed diplomatic statement. The study is based on qualitative comparative analysis of the texts from three media sources in Kazakhstan (Ulyssmedia, Orda, Radio Azattyq) and three in Kyrgyzstan (Radio Azattyk, 24.kg, AKIpress), obtained by keyword searching and screened for substantive reference to official positioning. Items were coded in terms of valence [positive/neutral/negative portrayal] and for the predominant narrative moves, i.e. legality and United Nations norms, humanitarian protection, security discourse, and procedural legitimacy. Findings indicate convergences in narratives of the formal diplomatic contents: both states are told through ceasefire calls, civilian protection, international law, and a two-state solution. Differences lie in emphasis. Kazakhstani coverage justifies its stance using governance and diplomacy, and Radio Azattyq prioritizes procedure around sustainable commitments. Kyrgyz media emphasize solidarity and humanitarian mobilization, while Azattyk highlights sharper morals-legal language and cues of accountability. Overall, the study illuminates domestication of war by looking at how Central Asian discourse presents war and reveals the influence of narration in the genesis of perceived legitimacy of foreign policy.

Keywords: media framing, conflict narratives, war in Gaza Strip, foreign policy communication, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

Introduction

The escalation of hostilities in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory in October 2023 rapidly became a sustained international crisis with far-reaching humanitarian, legal, and diplomatic consequences. The United Nations (UN) investigative and human rights reporting has repeatedly conflicted about civilian protection concerns, detention-related issues, and issues of accountability, unilaterally putting the violence in the context-established international humanitarian law, and human rights law and norms (UNHRC, 2024; UNHCHR, 2024). In parallel, the UN humanitarian situation reporting has been following the decline in the living conditions and constant restrictions on the access of aid (UNOCHA, 2026a, 2026b). Together, these institutional sources enable the provision of the key categories through which the war is narrated and given judgment within public debate, including civilian protection, proportionality, access to humanitarian aid, and ceasefire diplomacy.

Narratives are important because they structure public meaning: they shape what the main problem is, which side appears to be legitimate, and what solutions are presented as acceptable. The

issue of Israel-Palestine is especially fought over because a number of registers are simultaneously encompassed - humanitarian suffering, competing legal claims, security issues, geopolitics, and religious symbolism. At the same time, an informational environment in the context of the war is conditioned by the risks and limitations of journalists, which influence what can be verified and multiplied (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2025; UNESCO, 2024). Influential protests on overlays are reshaping the circulation movement and evaluating the criteria of reporting content. Influential campaigns of freedom of media and referendum safeguards for democracy further added to influence the circulation of the conflict accounts and assessing solutions (Freedom House, 2024, 2025). Under these conditions, domestic media in third countries can become important intermediaries and can help to select authoritative sources and translate distant violence into locally meaningful political judgements.

This mediation can be usefully viewed from a vantage point in Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are in a far-flung corner of the world from the theatre of war, yet the war is salient for domestic purposes as well as for the international standing of both states. Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attacks on civilians and hostage taking, requested humanitarian access, called for restraint in an effort to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians, and reaffirmed its commitment to a two-state solution, similar to its longer-standing official determination (MFA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023; MFA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d.). As was also reported in public discourse, Kazakhstan's stances might also apply to deliberations on stabilization and recovery arrangements and are therefore open to potentially adaptive stance dynamics over time (Anadolu Agency, 2026). Kyrgyzstan also has had a similar signal preoccupation with humanitarian concern and negotiated settlement and has repeated indications of providing aid and solidarity with the civilians affected, and reiterated support for Palestinian statehood (MES of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2024; AKIpress, 2024). Reporting also directs their agenda to a governance dimension of "stance" in which authorities deal with public expression and polarisation as part of domestic stability (Eurasianet, 2023).

Independent media are key to this process. Official statements seldom enter into public debate as neutral text, but are recast in terms of their original context as either different or similar. Firstly, by the selection of headlines; secondly, the selection of quotes; thirdly, explanation and evaluative cues that encourage audiences to interpret official positioning as either principled, adequate, inconsistent, or performative. Even in the absence of any explicit editorializing, choices about what to foreground, even about deciding what is important to be heard in a complex media ecosystem from international law issues to humanitarian catastrophe, to security concerns, to domestic stability is challenging. Even without any explicit editorializing about the news, choices about what to foreground have an effect on interpretation in the media ecosystem (Internews, 2024). Despite the literature on Israel-Palestine framing in the Western and major international media, the systematic research on the ways the Central Asian independent outlets narrate and assess the positioning of the governments of their countries after October 2023 is limited.

This article fills this gap by examining independent media framing of the news in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan between October 2023 and February 2026. How do media outlets present the view of the government position (positive, neutral, or negative) and what narrative moves underlie these? Conceptually, stance as a mediated object that is shaped by salience, sourcing, and evaluation is approached. Methodologically, the study reverts to qualitative analysis carried out by texts published in three outlets in Kazakhstan (Ulysmidia, Orda, Radio Azattyq) and three in Kyrgyzstan (Radio Azattyk, 24.kg, AKIpress), obtained through keyword search and the relevance of texts. The research codes each item for the valence and justificatory moves (e.g., whether it is legal, whether it is for humanitarian reasons, whether it is for security reasons, procedural legitimacy, etc.). The article makes

the case that while both states converge upon (some) diplomatic grammar (ceasefire, humanitarian protection, international legality, two-state settlement), the receptacles of these diplomatic language digestions vary depending on the legitimization of lexicological dimension of each country/moment. The article continues on to include a framing of existing theories, a review of literature, methodology, comparative results, a discussion, and a conclusion.

Literature Review

Global Frames on Israel-Palestine Conflict: regime and contestation

A great amount of work has been done to study the way how Israel-Palestine war is portrayed in the Western press, along with major international media. A finding is reemerging that coverage is frequently skewed in a way that favors frames congruent with dominant political narratives in the political space from which the coverage originates, in particular “security threat”, “counterterrorism”, and “law and order”, while communities of Palestinians are pigeonholed, prednisone or made to be seen largely through vocabulary of violence and militancy (Park & Oliullah, 2025; Sjobeck, 2025). In a comparative study of different outlets in the United States, for example, Fox News is said to favor a high reliance on a “security threat” frame of the situation that emphasizes the necessity of Israel’s actions as defense, while The New York Times and CNN are said to emphasize a humanitarian crisis and moral responsibility frame more often (Park & Oliullah, 2025). Such findings have importance because they show that even within a given national media system, ideological orientation as well as newsroom practices can lead to a generation of systematically different interpretive emphases.

Comparative work outside the US realizes similar asymmetries in the representation of victims, use of words, and story structure. A mixed-method comparison of British and Swedish media from the post-October 2023 period highlights the importance of lexical choices (for example, the verbs used for deaths, labelling of the war, and visibility of casualties) that can influence moral attention/perceived innocence (Sjobeck, 2025). Even when media outlets seem to be reporting the same facts, framing differences are present through recurring narrative conventions: which deaths are individualised, whose voice anchors the storyline, which timeline is treated as a beginning, whether context is provided as structural history or immediate provocation, and so on.

Another piece of the literature relates to explicit bias and ideological positioning of the global broadcasters. A comparative headline analysis of Al Jazeera, CNN, Global Times, claims that it is the patterned choice of lexical and thematic vocabulary by particular headlines that reproduces different ideological narratives. In particular, Al Jazeera is claimed to have foregrounded Palestinian resilience via “narratives of strength” and of “resistance”. In CNN the vocabulary of its headlines is interpreted as more Israel centered in terms of saliency and labeling (Ibrar & Khan, 2025). While there are limitations to such headline-based designs (due, among other things, to their compression and tendency towards being designed to generate attention), this work illustrates how framing functions through the deployment of uneven language that leads audiences to specific causal and moral interpretations.

Recent studies have also developed the framing discussion through links with the peace/war journalism debates. As an example, work comparing CNN and Al Jazeera with the October 2023 escalation frames the contrast not only in terms of bias, but also display school of journalism. It distinguishes war journalism orientation towards violence and elite conflict and polarization and peace journalism orientation towards context, humanization and nonviolent options (Amer et al., 2025). The same conceptual shift is made in other framing studies, which view moral evaluation and solution

emphasis as key elements of framing. For example, a qualitative framing study using the application of Entman's four components explains how outlets can vary in the position mainly regarding moral judgement and remedies in the form of suggestions for action. It can be described as ranging from diplomatic neutrality to explicit condemnation rather than the basic event description (Ainani & Yudiansyah, 2025). These studies are useful, therefore, because they refocus attention away from "who is right" to how journalistic narratives tend to normalize particular moral and political conclusions.

However, the literature leaves several issues underexamined that are central to the present study. First, a lot of the Israel-Palestinian framing scholarship is conflict-centric; short stories or papers analyze how an outlet frames the story around Israel, Hamas, or Palestinians (especially in the case of security vs. humanitarianism). But in general, they do not acknowledge third-country government positioning as the primary object of analysis. As a result, we know much less about how media tell a story about a state's position, as that of a prudent, principled, inconsistent, constrained, or performative state, when the war is far away but politically important. Second, numerous comparative research highlights lexical asymmetries and biased claims, when they would benefit from going further in understanding and identifying how such textual patterns translate to evaluative outcomes of their own that audiences could realize (e.g., legitimacy, adequacy, procedural credibility). Relatedly, designs oriented towards headlines are able to shed light on salience and labelling, while at the same time their compression means that their illustrative capacity to capture wider narrative moves through which moral evaluation and policy implications are assembled is reduced (Ibrar & Khan, 2025). Third, approaches to peace/war journalism add an important normative distinction, but tend to be applied to major broadcasters and are not always able to take into account how media operate under different structural constraints. Such constraints may include smaller markets, hybrid regimes, and reliance on official sources, where evaluation may be expressed indirectly rather than through explicit editorial voice. Finally, the dominant geographical focus on the US, Western Europe, and global broadcasters means that the media ecosystems of Central Asia remain on the margins of this debate, even though the war and conflict terrains there provide a revealing site for studying the domestication of global conflicts under distinctive foreign policy strategies and under the conditions of domestic governance. Addressing these gaps, by reorienting attention away from the protagonists of the war and instead focusing on the government stance as a mediated object, this article uses a comparative Central Asian design, demonstrates how similar diplomatic repertoires can be narrated using different legitimacy logics in different outlets and contexts.

Central Asia: media structure, constraints, and implications for international conflict coverage

While a large body of literature exists on Israel-Palestine framing literature, the Central Asian media environment has been generally covered in the literature through the presentation of different sets of questions, including questions about ownership, political control, professional ethics, and audience consumption patterns. This scholarship offers a critical background of understanding why and how narratives may be crafted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, even in contexts when the focal event may be external.

First, structural analyses underline the fact that media ownership and channels of influence in the region are politically consequential and also frequently non-transparent. In Kazakhstan, media ownership is said to be deeply centralized and tied to politically connected elites, as well as means of significant media footprints of Russian state-owned media and infrastructure (Dumont et al., 2021a). In

Kyrgyzstan, ownership is explained as relatively more diversified and, nevertheless, plagued by vulnerabilities caused by political pressure and elite capture as well as the strong presence of Russian state media (Dumont et al., 2021b). These patterns are relevant to the story of conflict internationally because they determine the overall ecosystem of greater and lesser permissible interpretations, sourcing routines, and strategic sensitivities of outlets operating under varying degrees of constraint. Second, audience-level research shows media usage and trust patterns to be different across Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in ways that might play a role in what kinds of narratives are persuasive. Survey-based work reveals the dominance of television to date as a main source of information in both countries, while also reflecting differences in the relative role of radio, newspapers, and internet-based news use (Junisbai et al., 2015). From a framing perspective, this has important implications as the authority of certain media formats as well as the distribution of audiences across media platforms can influence the circulation of official framings and the survival of alternative framings.

Third, professional conditions, in particular ethical pressures and practical constraints, have been repeatedly found to be key characteristics of journalism in Central Asia. A comparative study of journalists in several Central Asian republics has brought out ethics such as imbalance and politicized reporting, where ethics have been formulated out of professional ideals but are structurally constrained choices (Kurambayev & Freedman, 2019). For studies of international crises, this body of work implies that stories about crises may not be derived from ideological content alone, but also from risk management: what is acceptable to say, who the acceptable sources are, and how critique is expressed (directly, indirectly, or by selective quotation).

Even so, these studies do not fully demonstrate the process of concretizing structural conditions into concrete storylines when the topic concerns a highly polarized foreign conflict. Ownership and influence profiles are profiles of concentration and vulnerability, but not very often mapping downstream with effects on framing choices: what sources will become safe, what will be emphasized, and what risk of ambiguity may be strategically kept in place (Dumont et al., 2021a, 2021b). Audience research does chart media habits but does little to help understand the ways independent, online-first sources are translating official diplomacy into persuasive narratives for various audiences (Junisbai et al., 2015). Work on journalistic ethics is useful in documenting professional pressures, but too often they stop before specifying the textual tactics by which critique is handled at risk (Kurambayev & Freedman, 2019). The result is a disconnect between the macro level of accounts of the media environment, as opposed to the microanalysis of the way an external war is domesticated. This article bridges that gap in the literature by exploring how independent outlets in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tell the story of the government's position on Gaza and detect the recurring narrative moves through which legitimacy is affirmed, bracketed, or questioned.

How frames are identified and “measured” in conflict framing research

Framing studies usually have a structure combining the theoretical definitions and observable textual indicators. Some designs use frame categories derived with deductive principles (often adapted from established typologies, especially by coding how and how not certain interpretive packages show up in headlines, leads, sourcing patterns, and recurrent theme patterns) (Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Park & Oliullah, 2025). Others apply inductive methods, letting the frames arise with close reading, thematic analysis, or qualitative coding, often concentrating on the structure of narrative, ethical assessment, and cues to solutions (Amer et al., 2025; Ainani & Yudiansyah, 2025). A further methodological direction focuses on standardization and clarity in the operationalization of how “frames” are spread across studies, and framing research has sometimes been fragmented in its

empirical practices (Saperas & Carrasco-Campos, 2015). Despite these varied approaches, however, the underlying logic is consistent with the logic of Entman's model in the sense that frames become visible in patterns of emphasis and omission that channel audiences toward particular definitions of the nature of what the conflict is, who matters, who is responsible, and what needs to be done (Entman, 1993).

Overall, there are solid bases in the literature from which analyses can be developed for how media narratives are framed by framing theory (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohring, 2008) and the empirical evidences on the framing of Israel-Palestine in western and major international media are substantial (Amer et al., 2025; Ibrar & Khan, 2025; Park & Oliullah, 2025). In parallel, Central Asia scholarship elucidates structural conditions, which shape journalism in the region-ownership patterns, the way stakeholders receive outside foreign influences, consumption by audiences, and limitations of journalistic work of professionals (Dumont et al., 2021a; Junisbai et al., 2015; Kurambayev & Freedman, 2019). Yet all too rarely do these literatures intersect: there has been little systematic study of how the post-October 2023 Israel-Palestine war was framed by Central Asian independent media, even less so the mediation of their own governments into a positioning within that war. Addressing this absence, the current article engages with the war mostly as a discursive background. It also reorients the analytical lens on government stance as a mediated object by exploring how the independent outlets in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tell the story of the official positioning as principled, cautious, contradictory, lackluster, or politically constrained, and how these depictions are the result of repetitive narrative moves and evaluative framing.

Theoretical framework

Framing has become one of the most popular methods in analyzing the construction of meaning of mediated political events. In its most frequently cited formulation, a frame functions by means of selection and salience: some features of a reality observed are foregrounded in order to favor a certain definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation for treatment (Entman, 1993). This is particularly true in the case of war and international crises where, quite often, the same episode can be told in the form of a security crisis, a humanitarian disaster, a legal conflict, a moral breaking, or a geopolitical conflict. All suggest different "common-sense" conclusions about responsibility, legitimacy, and appropriate action.

At the same time, framing scholarship is often conceptualized as conceptually diverse and methodologically plural, which poses problems for comparability across studies (Matthes and Kohring, 2008). Meta-level work on framing research has thus called for a greater emphasis on making both the theory and empirical indicators more clearly operationalized as well as more transparent to the other (Saperas & Carrasco-Campos, 2015). In conflict contexts, this concern is not just a technical one: frames are not neutral descriptions but are interpretive packages that help to define which people are inside the boundaries of empathy or for whom the blame should be squarely placed and what legitimacy there is to the claims of actors. As a result, framing analysis is especially appropriate for the analysis of the depiction of the Israel-Palestine war, an issue that is laden with historically and morally laden interpretations in the various media systems and political space.

Methodology

This research engages in a comparative qualitative media analysis research methodology and assesses the narrative and evaluation of the position of the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding the Israel-Palestine war from October 2023 to February 2026 in independent media outlets

of these countries. This time frame was selected to record coverage from the early initial escalation and first official reactions to the subsequent diplomatic and humanitarian time frames, including the debates over ceasefire/stabilization and positioning once more. The selected outlets for this analysis were six outlets that have been chosen for their relative independence and relevance to their audience: Kazakhstan: Ulysmmedia (n = 5), Orda (n = 9), and Radio Azattyq (n = 6), Kyrgyzstan: 24.kg (n = 7), AKIpress (n = 10), and Radio Azattyk (n = 4). In Kyrgyzstan, the chosen outlets are some of Kyrgyzstan's most widely read online news outlets and do not work within direct state media structures, while in Kazakhstan, they were chosen as some of the most popular outlets that are not controlled by the state, thus providing suitable access platforms for the analytical field of how non-state outlets mediate official foreign policy messages.

The corpus was compiled in a systematic way by using each outlet's internal search function and consistent conflict-related keywords in the relevant languages (e.g., Gaza, Palestine, Israel, Hamas, ceasefire, humanitarian aid, UN). Retrieved items were screened based upon inclusion criteria: (a) publication within the timeframe, (b) substantive reference to the positioning of national government, such that found in statements or actions taken by the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the parliament, government agencies, and/or official humanitarian initiatives, and (c) sufficient narrative content to make interpretable analysis possible. Exclusion criteria were: duplicate publications, reproduction of international news without an internal connection, and short notices that did not contain interpretive content. The final sample consisted of N = 41 articles published by 6 outlets (Kazakhstan: n = 20; Kyrgyzstan: n = 21).

Analysis continued using qualitative content analysis based on framing logic (Entman, 1993). Each article underwent a valence-based categorization of how the government's status was presented in the article, either positively, neutrally, or negatively, depending on the dominant evaluation signaled in the headline/lead and strengthened in the overall narrative closure, which was supported by text evidence extracts. To interpret the valence judgments, for every article, each of the main sources (who is quoted) and dominant frame (e.g., legal/UN, humanitarian, security, diplomacy, or procedural legitimacy) was noted. Findings are reported in the form of a comparative profile in terms of the legitimacy, neutrality, or problematization of official stances in the independent media in the two country cases and what recurring narrative moves lie behind these evaluations.

Results

Kazakhstan: 3 independent outlets, the mediated "stance" of the state

Across the Kazakhstan corpus, the government is careful never to position itself on the war in Israel-Palestine (Gaza) as a single fixed stance but rather constructs the issue within regularly recurring narrative routines showcasing various features of the state, such as principled diplomacy, humanitarian responsibility, protection of citizens, and information governance. While the dependence on official voices (presidential statements, MFA briefings, cabinet letters) is the same for Ulysmmedia.kz, Orda.kz, and Radio Azattyq (Kazakhstan service) report, assess, and contextualize the official position differently – from administrative reports to legitimization of voice accenting to evaluative scrutinizing (Ulysmmedia.kz, 2023, October 17; Orda.kz, 2023, November 29; Radio Azattyq, 2023, October 11).

Ulysmmedia.kz: position of citizen protection and "rules-based prudence"

Ulysmedia tells the story of Kazakhstan's position mostly in terms of consular action and crisis management. The government is characterized by its efforts of practical mobilization – tracking of citizens in Israel and Gaza, support by hotlines, and attempts at evacuations under the uncertainty (Ulysmedia.kz 2023 October 9; Ulysmedia.kz 2023 October 16). In this framing, “stance” is showcased in administrative responsibility as much as diplomacy. When reporting official content of foreign policy, Ulysmedia is reproducing a balanced and legal-diplomatic formula: condemnation of violence against civilians and rejection of terrorist methods paired with appeals for restraint in inflicting unnecessary damage on civilians, developing emphasis on the international legal framework, law related to the UN, and a two-state formula (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17). Presidential remarks are also written in a principled register – the use of terrorism as a means of settling long-standing disputes is portrayed as simply unjustifiable (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 13). Overall, the mood of the message is neutral (if not positive) as obstacles are generally explained by the external restrictions, while the role of Kazakhstan inspires continuous engagement and responsibility. This continues over to information governance, when MFA reports are publicly taken to reject rumors (e.g. anticipated refugee relocation to Kazakhstan) and encourage crediting official irrefutable evidence (Ulysmedia.kz, 2025, June 22).

Orda.kz: position as humanitarian leadership and international activity

Orda.kz's conception is more outward-looking and explicitly legitimizing. It repeatedly demonstrates Kazakhstan as a humanitarian force responding to the “catastrophic” situation in Gaza, emphasizing further shipments of assistance (food, bedding, medicines) as a result of a presidentially initiated project (Orda.kz 2023, November 29). Orda.kz also relates humanitarian assistance to the developments related to evacuation, strengthening the image of a practical solidarity and not a symbolic concern (Orda.kz, 2023, December 11). In the context of multilateral diplomacy, Orda.kz focuses on Kazakhstan's support of UN General Assembly demands (ceasefire-related and humanitarian access) and explicitly explains the non-binding characteristics of General Assembly resolutions in comparison to Security Council decisions, which put Kazakhstan's position within an institutional order in which law and procedure are important (Orda.kz, 2023, December 13). The same logic goes further with its coverage of calls to escalate efforts towards a ceasefire and repeating the re-statement of the two-state formula and 1967 borders as the bases of settlement (Orda.kz, 2024, March 6).

Crucially, Orda.kz's tone is frequently changing from neutral relaying to affirmative evaluation. It reports on Kazakhstan being “supporting” peace initiatives and describes diplomatic developments as positive milestones (Orda.kz, 2024, June 4; Orda.kz, 2025, October 3). It also sets all information into the background: refugee-resettlement rumors are denied as false, and audiences are directed to official sources (Orda.kz, 2025, June 23). Even potentially sensitive strategic choices, such as joining the Abraham Accords are narrated as logical continuations of Kazakhstan's foreign policy (Orda.kz, 2025, November 7). By February 2026, Orda.kz maintains this legitimizing register since it reports about Kazakhstan being willing to provide personnel (including military/medical components) to new stabilization initiatives that are constructed as part of post-conflict arrangements (Orda.kz, 2026, February 20). In sum, Orda.kz creates a by and large positive account of Kazakhstan's position: humanitarian, active, and engaged with the world.

Radio Azattyq (Kazakhstan): justifying and procedural legitimacy

Azattyq treats overlapping themes of evacuation, official statements, and diplomatic coordination, but makes “stance” something that is to be checked and interpreted instead of accepted as official, settled news. There is an initial emphasis on mystification (denial of the fact of missing Kazakhstanis) and detachment from the certainty of the number of citizens remaining in Gaza (Radio Azattyq, 2023, October 15; Radio Azattyq, 2023, November 17). It also includes briefings on those left in Gaza through a register that highlights constraints and limits of information instead of valid performance narratives only (Radio Azattyq, 2023, November 6).

More importantly, Azattyq extends “stance” to issues of domestic legitimacy. When Kazakhstan’s foreign policy positioning is more strategic in terms of joining big diplomatic frameworks or discussing possible springs and possible security participation, Azattyq emphasizes interpretation and other institutional authorization. Its coverage of Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords focuses on the move as one of strategic alignment to be explained (Radio Azattyq, 2025, November 7). In February 2026, Azattyq put up parliamentary procedure in relation to any potential military involvement possibly related to Gaza, at the end of which oversight and authorization play a key role in the narration of the issue (Radio Azattyq, 2026, February 20). This results in more of a mixed picture: Kazakhstan may have an internationally active face, but also a procedurally ambiguous face where external messaging or domestic decision process does not fit well together.

Synthesis - one side, three mediated meanings

Across all three outlets, the official repertoire is broadly consistent – condemnation of violence/terrorism, emphasis on civilian protection, emphasis on the use of international law and claws UN/process, ceasefire language, two-state solution, humanitarian assistance (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17; Orda.kz, 2024, March 6; Radio Azattyq, 2023, October 15). The difference is in the manner in which this repertoire is domesticated. Ulysmedia makes the state capacity and citizen protection out of the concept of stance (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 9). Orda.kz raises this position to humanitarian leadership and proactive diplomacy, more often than not in a legitimizing manner (Orda.kz, 2025, October 3). Azattyq, in the meantime, maintains an open position to be checked and subjected to a procedural criticism, especially where there are intersections between any strategic elementary commitment and a domestic institutional legitimacy (Radio Azattyq, 2026, February 20). This within-country variation is of analytical importance in light of the realization that government stance is not only available as communicated by officials, and to the extent that their words were likely adopted by outlets, but also in terms of how outlets rendered the communication of that message into stories of competence, moral responsibility, and correctness of procedure.

Kyrgyzstan: Independent Media Narratives of Government Positioning

Across the Kyrgyzstan corpus, the turn of the government on an Israel-Palestine (Gaza) war is built on repeated routines of narrative production where humanitarian solidarity to the community, multilateral legality, and, subsequently, repeated emphases on clear moral denunciation are present. While Radio Azattyk (Kyrgyz service), 24.kg, AKIpress also use the statements of official sources extensively, the three outlets differ in what they foreground: Azattyk has given the moral-legal technicality of statements made by elites the most importance, 24.kg has framed the humanitarian mobilization and mechanisms for delivery, and AKIpress stabilizes the position as policy continuity, while also imprints domestic discussion as well as activism (Radio Azattyk, 2023, October 9; 24.kg,

2023, November 12; AKI

Radio Azattyk (Kyrgyzstan): position in the perspective of moral urgency in the legal-diplomatic context

Azattyk cites the words of the first line of the MFA as cautious and de-escalatory: worry over escalation and an appeal to both sides to cease hostilities and to start political-diplomatic dialogue (Radio Azattyk, 2023, October 9). Over time, however, within the outlet, more emphasis is given to a sharper moral register in the elite discourse. In March of 2024, Azattyk, a senior official, denounces terrorism and reminds of Kyrgyzstan's condemnation of the October 7 attack, giving respect for self-defense in Israel and the immediate invocation of international law and international actions to halt what is explicitly named "genocide Bush" (Radio Azattyk, 2024, March 19). Later, the presidential speeches are framed by Azattyk's media as reaffirmation of the ceasefire urgency, the protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure under the international humanitarian law, and the two-state settlement formula based on the UN principles with explicit support of Palestinian self-determination and statehood (Radio Azattyk, 2024, July 4). By September 2025, risking heavily in the UN General Assembly, Azattyk advertised for the "genocide" to be "put to an end", international judicial investigation is demanded in parallel with condemnation of terrorism and the restatement of the two-state solution on 1967 borders (Radio Azattyk, 2025, September 24). In this outlet's narration, Kyrgyzstan's position is therefore "legal-diplomatic" according to its structure but increasingly moralized as to its contents.

24.kg: stand up as humanitarian solidarity as institutional action

In the coverage by 24.kg, the stance is told rather, through humanitarian empathy and practical help, without much focus on procedural critique. The outlet reports on the presidential calls to stop fighting, severely harming civilians, and initiating negotiations (24.kg, 2023, November 9). It then accords considerable salience to solidarity language in the context of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): Japarov is quoted saying catastrophic events in Palestine were expressed in its condolences and readiness to offer humanitarian aid to the civilians in the Gaza Strip (24.kg, 2023, November 12). A distinctive thing about 24.kg is that different mechanisms for institutionalizing solidarity are seen: announcements by the leadership of parliamentary institutions about donating the salary for one day (24.kg, 2023, November 14), a dedicated account of the government for receiving donations by the population (24.kg, 2023, December 19), delivery of humanitarian cargo through emergency services channels with transition via a humanitarian intermediary for distribution (24.kg, 2024, January 16). The outlet also reports some other official diplomacy, repeating that civilian suffering is a cause for concern and backing an end to hostilities in the country in favor of a peaceful and law-based settlement. (24.kg, 2025 June 25; 24.kg, 2025 October 9) Overall, 24.kg builds a neutral to positive image from the standpoint of governments by emphasizing the message of empathy, humanitarianism, and verifiability of official messages over time.

AKIpress: stance as policy continuity

AKIpress forms the creation of Kyrgyzstan's position by establishing continuity along policies and a constant flow of information about institutions: initiation of the first calls to end hostilities in AKIpress (2023, October 9), President have recognized the right of independence and sovereign statehood of the Palestinians AKIpress (2023, November 11), Opening of the dialogue between the

leader of parliament and the representative of Palestine AKIpress (2023, November 14). It then reinforces multilateral/legal positioning by reporting on official welcome of a declared derecognition of UN Security Council resolution on cease-fire (AKIpress, 2024, March 26) and regular diplomatic practices and consultations which provide repeated messaging for Palestinian statehood and UN-based settlement principles (AKIpress, 2024, May 20; AKIpress, 2025, January 16; AKIpress, 2026, February 24).

AKIpress is also unique in the way it exposes the domestic arena surrounding the stance. It not only reports parliamentary inquiry about the MFA's position early in the crisis period (AKIpress, 2023, October 16) but also reports a public action in support of Palestine in Bishkek (AKIpress, 2023, October 28) but also "stance" is narrated not just in terms of executive diplomacy but in terms of an issue of public and parliamentary salience. In addition, AKIpress features an opinion section in which a vehemently advocative writing is published, which has a stronger national argument and legal positioning regarding Gaza. In an analytical sense, it is important because it demonstrates how discourse on moral and legal issues can circulate outside of official statements and can potentially increase expectations of what a "sufficient" position should be (Malikov, 2025, May 1).

Synthesis: Three outlets, three legitimacy narratives

Despite the variation of the Kyrgyz outlets, the official rhetoric is generally similar; the repeated denunciations of violence, the necessity to spare civilian lives, open the way for humanitarian relief efforts, engage in covid diplomatic negotiations, as well as advocating for a two-state solution based on the international principles of law are all echoes heard throughout all three Kyrgyz outlets. (Radio Azattyk, 2023 October 9; 24.kg, 2023 November 9; AKIpress, 2024 March 26) The difference is the way in which this repertoire is domesticated. Azattyk foregrounds aspects of moral urgency and responsibility in the framework of law (Radio Azattyk, 2024, 19 March; Radio Azattyk, 2025, 24 September). 24.kg highlights humanitarian solidarity institutionalized through institutions and the delivery of aid (24.kg, 2023, 19 December; 24.kg, 2024, 16 January). On one hand, AKIpress stabilizes the continuation of policy, but functions on the other side based also on domestic visibility and debate (AKIpress, 2023, October 16; AKIpress, 2023, October 28). As a consequence, Kyrgyzstan's position is mediated less through narratives of consular competence (which are dominant in much of the coverage from Kazakhstan) and more through a combination of the registers of solidarity, legality, and, at key moments, explicit moral condemnation, which yields an overall portrayal of the stance that is neutral to positive, but rhetorically more emphatic.

Comparative Analysis of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

A cautious comparison of the two corpora reveals more similarity than difference in the formal structure of the stances by governments, but some divergence in rhetorical intensity and in the frame of diplomacy presented to the outside world, which are emphasized at different stages. In both of those cases, independent media outlets constantly repeat official rhetoric based on ceasefire/de-escalation, on the civilian population, humanitarian aid, a two-state settlement based on international law and UN principles (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17; Orda.kz, 2024, March 6; Radio Azattyk, 2024, July 4; AKIpress, 2024, March 26). Where there are differences, they are not clashing (both countries use multiple registers), but emerge with greater clarity when the coverage is read through time through momentary periods of escalation, while policy messaging is afterward communicated.

Phase 1: Emergency response to the October 2023 escalation (October 2023)

In both countries, the official position stated by the most independent outlets has been de-escalatory and diplomatic. Kyrgyzstan's MFA appeals to the sides to halt the steps of enmity and initiate political-diplomatic dialogue (Radio Azattyk 2023, October 9; AKIpress 2023, October 9). Kazakhstan's early position, as relayed in Ulysmedia, is characterized by a combination of de-escalation with more explicitly "balanced" condemnation structure consisting of condemning Hamas attacks and hostage taking as well as a demand on Israel to avoid disproportionate use of force, while at the same time persistently emphasizing international law and calling for a two-state solution (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17). In other words, both states are narrated in a tone that urges dialogue and restraint, but where Kazakhstan has early messaging (in your Kazakhstan corpus) that is more explicitly narrated in the tone of the language of condemnation and restraint, whereas Kyrgyzstan has an early language of concern and call to stop fighting.

During this first stage, there is also mention in the media of both countries about measures taken by the states, linked to citizens, and the response mechanisms in practical terms, however in the case of the Kazakhstan corpus, there is more detailed and continuous reporting on measures taken among citizens (hotlines, numbers, evacuation logistics) (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 9; Radio Azattyk, 2023, October 11). This is not taken as a "unique" national characteristic rather it is only a difference about what is evident and elaborated in the specific texts sampled.

Phase 2: Institutionalization of solidarity & humanitarian response (November – December 2023)

By November-December 2023, the position in both countries becomes more palpable on an institutional level: not only in the form of a diplomatic declaration, but also in the form of equalization and signals in public. In Kyrgyzstan, the position is told through the performances of solidarity (parliamentary donation initiative) and public humanitarian readiness (Islamic multilateral environment) (24.kg, 2023, November 12; 24.kg, 2023, November 14; AKIpress, 2023, November 14). Kyrgyz coverage also brings to light a state-connected mechanism of fundraising (special account to collect money for the civilians in Gaza) (24.kg, 2023, December 19). In the case of Kazakhstan, Orda.kz describes humanitarian assistance as an action endorsed by the president following a "catastrophic" situation and describes UN General Assembly voting dynamics related to the ceasefire, where Kazakhstan voted in support of the resolution (Orda.kz, 2023, November 29; Orda.kz, 2023, December 13). At this stage a real difference is not that one country is humanitarian and the other is not (both are), but that Kyrgyz outlets (in your sample) give more prominence to mobilization instruments of the domestic population (donations, fundraising), while Kazakhstan outlets (especially Orda) give more prominence to the framing of multilateral voting and international diplomacy together with aid.

Phase 3: 2024 - Multilateral legality but rhetoric disagrees about intensity (March - July 2024)

In 2024, both states maintain being told as supporting a ceasefire and law-based settlement. However, the insertion of what is referred to as a strong moral legal register through statements among the elites in Kyrgyzstan. A notable example is how the speech of Edil Baisalov, denouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel's right to self-defense, also refers to Gaza as "genocide" and demands international action, explicitly labeling the United States as the major player to end it (Radio Azattyk, 2024, March 19; 24.kg, 2024, March 18). In the Kazakhstan corpus for a rather similar period, Orda.kz focuses on the pleas from Kazakhstan to strengthen the ceasefire actions and repeat the two-state

formula for a settlement and the borders of 1967 through diplomatic platforms (Orda.kz, 2024, March 6). This is not to say that Kazakhstan has “no moral language”, but rather asserts that the greatest moral escalation in Kyrgyz corpus is more explicit and more frequently highlighted by Azattyk.

By July 2024, the former of these two state-settlement principles and principles of international humanitarian law remained the basis of Kyrgyzstan’s presidential discourse, actively supporting Palestinian self-determination and statehood (Radio Azattyk, 2024, July 4). This is broadly consistent with Kazakhstan’s continued reliance on legality, language of negotiation on settlement (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17; Orda.kz, 2024, March 6). There is a convergence in the legal-diplomatic framework with moral vocabulary of the media in Kyrgyzstan.

Phase 4. Longer-term positioning/outside alignment (February 2025 - February 2026)

From mid-2025, for both cases, multilateral positioning and engagement continue. In particular in Kazakhstan, two topics emerge with great visibility in Orda.kz and Azattyq: (1) how to govern the information surrounding rumors of refugee resettlement, as they are publicly rejected by the MFA (Orda.kz, 2025, June 23; Ulysmedia.kz, 2025, June 22), and (2) how to position oneself at the top positions through the diplomatic frames of the US involving the recognition by the White House of Kazakhstan’s position, the membership in the Abraham Accords, the participation in Board of Peace. Azattyq Kazakhstan, meanwhile, addresses the ones reflecting the security orientation of key issues, via the domestic legitimacy with questions such as parliamentary procedure and authorization (Radio Azattyq, 2026, February 20).

In Kyrgyzstan during 2025, the corpus still focuses its attention on multilateral engagement (OIC-related meetings, diplomatic consultations) and contains the strongest manifestation of moral-legal discourse among the sample: the speech of the country’s president in the UN demanding a stop of “genocide”, and international judicial investigation, while the condemnation of terrorism and reiterations of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders were repeated (Radio Azattyk, 2025, September 24). AKIpress ensures the continuity of the policies through diplomacy and references related to the ceasefire and multilateral through multiple diplomatic contacts up to February 2026 (AKIpress 2025, September 29; AKIpress 2026, February 24). A realistic contrast at this stage is that Kazakhstan outlets (especially Orda) more visibly frame positioning in terms of the US-linked initiatives and “peace plan” diplomacy, whereas Russian language and “peace-plan” diplomacy, in contrast to Kyrgyz outlets (especially Azattyk). They more visibly frame positioning in terms of moral-legal condemnation and accountability language, albeit even though both continue to cite two-state legality and ceasefire.

Discussion

The findings from comparisons support a more cautionary but no less reliable claim of convergence that the period from October 2023 – February 2026. There is a common diplomatic repertoire between multiple media houses in each of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to re-report, including calls to ceasefire/de-escalation, provision of humanitarian protection, international juridical underpinning and a two-state settlement solution, all corroborated by differences among media houses in one or both countries but mostly as a matter of accentuating rival perspectives and rhetorical intensity rather than opposing national sides. This is the congruence that suits the incentives of small and medium-sized states to limit the reputational and strategic costs of polarized conflicts through

anchoring positions in widely legitimate vocabularies. Kazakhstan's multivector diplomacy emphasizes balancing between partners and preventing sticking to narrow, strict alignment, thus making the language of legality and humanitarianism a low-risk position (Ussenova, 2022; Wang, 2024). Kazakhstan's voting in the UN General Assembly is also indicative of caution in controversial conflict resolutions, opposing legitimacy going forward, as well as with minimal commitment (Yuneman, 2023).

Within that common stock of repertoire, media stories vary in their construction of legitimacy. Framing theory explains the reason why: frames define problems, attribute responsibility, make moral evaluations, and imply remedies (Entman, 1993). In both corpora, the use of the word stance is more strongly legitimate when the fronts of assistance of humanitarian, multilateral diplomacy, and search for peace are framed against the background. Stance is more open for contestation when authorization, accountability, or incongruity are foregrounded between different outlets to which its domestic procedures are referred. Methodologically speaking, this is consistent with the idea that frames are patterned choices and structures of salience that frame meaning even when there is no conscious editorializing on the part of the authors (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).

The environment within the media and civic spaces is also conditioned in how critique can be voiced. In its assessment of the media landscape, it was found that in Kazakhstan, strong structural pressures favor reporting on official sources and safer worded reporting about sensitive issues (Internews, 2024). Regional documentation of shrinking civic space illustrates the fact that freedom of assembly and expression is often selectively constrained, and generally decides what gets narrated, and how mobilizations are regulated. Kazakhstan-focused submissions to UN organs additionally include ongoing concerns related to assemblies and media freedom. Such contexts help explain the often arbitrary nature of coverage that tends toward official source hegemony: evaluation is indirect rather than direct condemnation. Within-country variation is nonetheless meaningful because of the answer to questions about procedural scrutiny as "stance", in which case they recast a domestic legitimacy question.

The dialectical difference of rhetorical intensity, namely solidarity terms and the vocabulary of moral-legal rhetoric in some segments of the Kyrgyz corpus, may be analyzed according to the rules of identity politics and regime, while avoiding the interpretation of it as a fixed national characteristic. Research on nation-building in Kazakhstan evokes the emphasis on the selective accommodation of traditional Islam within the framework of a secular identity, as well as suspicion of politicized forms of religious expression (Yemelianova, 2014). Recent work conceptualized Islam in Kazakhstan as the securitized field where assertive secularism justified the extended state control (Sikhimbayeva et al., 2025). This context is consistent with narratives to prioritize legality, diplomatic performance, and the rationality of governance. In Kyrgyzstan, analyses of the Japarov period speak of authoritarian drift, the increase of pressure on the media, civil society, and re-traditionalisation in public symbolism (Berloto & Fasola, 2024). This combination can make solidarity narratives reconnected, yet are not subjected to governance.

Overall, the discussion shores up the contribution of the article, which focuses on the militarised conflict in Gaza as not only an external crisis but a domestic landscape of legitimacy, wherein official formulae are analogized, domesticated, through media stories which follow foreign policy strategy, the structural constraints of media, and morally salient cultural vocabularies.

Conclusion

This article dealt with the symbolic representation of the position of their respective governments on the cases of Israel-Palestine war in the independent media of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan after the October 2023 escalation. Instead of taking “stance” as a fixed and diplomatic fact, however, the analysis held it to be a mediated object: a position intensified with the help of frames that recur, emphasis that is selective, and evaluative cues in news narratives. Between the two examples, there is great convergence in the formal language of positioning as official, combined with less significant but analytically important differences in what was put forward as the primary evidence of responsibility, legitimacy, and continuity over time in the sources.

At the level of official formulae reproduced by the outlets, no less than fifty times, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are repeatedly presented as endorsing the cessation of hostilities, protection of civilians and humanitarian access, preference for political-diplomatic settlement and a two-state framework grounded in international law and UN principles (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17; Orda.kz, 2024, March 6; Radio Azattyk, 2024, July 4; AKIpress, 2024, March 26). In the immediate aftermath of the escalation, official message from Kyrgyz authorities is framed under a discourse of de-escalation, i.e. asking actors to stop fighting and initiate the dialogue (Radio Azattyk, 2023, October 9; AKIpress, 2023, October 9), while in the early messaging from Kazakhstan in Kazakhstan corpus is combined condensation of attacks against civilian population, calling for restraint and legalities (Ulysmedia.kz, 2023, October 17). As the conflict continues, both countries appear to continue to use legality and diplomacy as legitimizing vocabularies while publicly anchor their positions in internationally recognized norms.

Where the cases differ less is in the presence of humanitarian concern and more in the level of moral intensification, and in the diplomatic frames that come to salience in the later time period. In Kyrgyzstan, the attitude is re-told using the language of solidarity as well as institutional initiatives of humanitarian aid, namely through visits from parliamentarians raising funds, a fundraiser, and mechanisms for the delivery of aid (24.kg, 2023, December 19; 24.kg, 2024, January 16). In addition, there were in the Kyrgyz corpus (in particular of Azattyk) moments where the rhetoric of the elite was quite strongly moralized (including explicit framing of genocide and appeals for bringing to justice on the international stage), yet there was also the specific condemnation of terrorism and the invocation of the limitations of international law (Radio Azattyk, 2024, March 19; Radio Azattyk, 2025, September 24). In Kazakhstan the references to humanitarian and legal aspects are still very present, but the attention to multilateral diplomacy is also there in subsequent coverage. The emphasis of the sphere of peaceful initiatives connected to the United States (Orda.kz, 2025, October 3) and also to new international frameworks (Orda.kz, 2026, February 20). Meanwhile, Azattyq Kazakhstan has shown that in cases where that stance implies higher-level commitments, the independent media can provide a procedural test of legitimacy by placing it into the foreground, bringing in the parliamentary authorization and the domestic institutional consistency of some of the internal party lines (Radio Azattyq, 2026, February 20).

The contribution of this study is empirical in including a Central Asian perspective in the literature on Israel-Palestine media framing and analytical in rendering the focus not only on the frames relating to the conflict parties but also to frames relating to domestic government positioning. Even at the points where explicit editorial judgement is limited, government stance is assessed by narrative design: what is emphasised (humanitarian catastrophe, legality, solidarity actions, procedural legitimacy), whose voices are at the centre of interpretation, and what actions are made visible as legitimate responses of the state. Future research should expand the sample to television and social

media.

It should be noted that this research has some limitations. It can only be based on a purposeful sampling of selected independent outlets, and it does not claim that all media ecosystems are represented. Future work could help expand the outlet sample, include social media dynamics, and, conversely, triangulate the media narratives with public opinion data. Overall, the available evidence indicates that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan fall on a mutual diplomatic grammar of ceasefire and legality. The Kyrgyz corpus emphasizes narrative practices of solidarity, performative positioning, and moral intensification, whereas the Kazakhstan corpus highlights governance performance, international engagement, and procedural considerations. Together, these patterns support the article's central argument that foreign policy guidance is continually produced and stabilized through media narratives.

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Орталық Азия призмасындағы Палестина: Қазақстан мен Қырғызстан тәуелсіз медиасының Газа секторындағы соғыс туралы нарративтері (2023-2026)

Бекжан Тұрдыбек
KIMEP University, Алматы, Қазақстан
email: bekzhan.turdybek@kimep.kz

Аңдатпа

2023 жылғы қазанда Израиль мен Палестина арасындағы соғыстың шиеленісуі гуманитарлық және стратегиялық деңгейде ұзақ мерзімді пікірталас тудырып, Орталық Азияға да әсер етті. Бұл мақала 2023 жылғы қазаннан 2026 жылғы ақпанға дейінгі кезеңде Қазақстан мен Қырғызстандағы тәуелсіз бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының Газа соғысына қатысты өз елдерінің үкімет ұстанымын қалай жариялап, қалай бағалайтынын талдайды. Үкіметтің ұстанымы өзгермейтін дипломатиялық мәлімдеме ретінде емес, фрейминг арқылы медиада құрылатын (медияланатын) объект ретінде қарастырылады. Зерттеу Қазақстандағы үш медиа дереккөздің (Ulyssmedia, Orda, Radio Azattyq) және Қырғызстандағы үш дереккөздің (Radio Azattyk, 24.kg, AKIpress) мәтіндерін сапалық салыстырмалы талдау негізінде жүргізілді. Материалдар кілт сөздер арқылы ізделіп, ресми позицияға мазмұнды түрде қатысты жарияланымдар іріктелді. Мәтіндер валенттілік бойынша (үкімет ұстанымын позитивті/бейтарап/негативті көрсету) және басым нарративтік тәсілдер бойынша кодталды. Олар: құқықтық шеңбер және Біріккен Ұлттар Ұйымы нормалары, гуманитарлық қорғаныс, қауіпсіздік дискурсы, және процедуралық легитимдік. Нәтижелер ресми дипломатиялық мазмұнның ұқсастығын көрсетеді, яғни екі елдің де ұстанымы атысты тоқтатуға шақыру, бейбіт тұрғындарды қорғау, халықаралық құқық және «екі мемлекет» формуласы арқылы баяндалады. Айырмашылықтар негізгі екпіндерде байқалады. Қазақстан бойынша материалдар көбіне ұстанымды басқарушылық тиімділік пен дипломатиялық белсенділік нарративтері арқылы легитимдейді, ал Radio Azattyq стратегиялық міндеттемелерге қатысты процедура, институттық легитимдік мәселелерін жиірек көтереді. Қырғызстан медиасы көбіне ынтымақтастық пен гуманитарлық жұмылдыруды алға шығарады, ал Azattyk моральдық-құқықтық лексиканы және жауапкершілікке қатысты сигналдарды айқынырақ көрсетеді. Жалпы, зерттеу соғыстың Орталық Азия дискурсында қалай жергіліктендірілетіндігінің және медиа нарративінің сыртқы саясат коммуникациясы легитимдігі қалай қабылданатынына ықпалын ашады.

Кілт сөздер: медиа фрейминг, қақтығыс нарративтері, Газа секторындағы соғыс, сыртқы саясат коммуникациясы, Қазақстан, Қырғызстан

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Палестина сквозь призму Центральной Азии: нарративы независимых медиа Казахстана и Кыргызстана о войне в секторе Газа (2023-2026)

Турдыбек Бекжан

KIMEP University, Алматы, Казахстан

email: bekzhan.turdybek@kimep.kz

Аннотация

Эскалация войны между Израилем и Палестиной в октябре 2023 года привела к долгосрочной гуманитарной и стратегической полемике, затронувшей, в том числе, Центральную Азию. В статье анализируется, как независимые СМИ Казахстана и Кыргызстана освещают и оценивают позицию своих правительств в отношении войны в Газе в период с октября 2023 года по февраль 2026 года. Государственная позиция рассматривается как медийно конструируемый объект (через фрейминг), а не как неизменное дипломатическое заявление. Исследование основано на качественном сравнительном анализе текстов трех медиаисточников Казахстана (Ulysmedia, Orda, Radio Azattyq) и трех источников Кыргызстана (Radio Azattyk, 24.kg, AKIpress), отобранных с помощью поиска по ключевым словам и фильтрации по критерию содержательного упоминания официального позиционирования. Материалы кодируются по валентности (позитивное/нейтральное/негативное представление позиции правительства) и по доминирующим нарративным приемам: правовые рамки и нормы ООН, гуманитарная защита, дискурс безопасности и процедурная легитимность. Результаты показывают сходство формального дипломатического содержания: обе страны описываются через призывы к прекращению огня, защиту гражданского населения, соблюдению международного права и формулу двух государств. Различия проявляются в акцентах. В Казахстане освещение чаще легитимирует позицию через нарративы управленческой эффективности и дипломатической активности, тогда как Radio Azattyq чаще подчеркивает процедурные аспекты и вопросы институциональной легитимности стратегических решений. В Кыргызстане медиа чаще акцентируют солидарность и гуманитарную мобилизацию, а Azattyk выделяет более резкую морально-правовую лексику и сигналы ответственности. В целом, исследование показывает, как война «доместицируется» в центральноазиатском дискурсе и как медийные нарративы влияют на восприятие легитимности внешнеполитической коммуникации.

Ключевые слова: медийный фрейминг, нарративы конфликта, война в секторе Газа, внешнеполитическая коммуникация, Казахстан, Кыргызстан

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